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IN 'THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff a.nd Respondent, 
-vs.- No. 8288 
HUGH BAILEY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts of appellant are substanti-
ally correct except that the following should ~be added. 
Witness Armond A. Luke, highway patrolman, drove 
the defendant and his companion to the residence of Mr. 
Delong,, who was the justice of the peace, and while he 
,vas talking to Mr. Delong's father, the defendant 
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'' jumpW. out of the car and started running ove.r towards 
Jack Yardley's place." (R.8) Whereupon Mr. Luke 
gave chase after the defendant and caught him. 
William q~ Bru~in, Mayor of Panguitch, observed 
the -defen-dant- for· some minutes :and testified that the 
defendant ''definitely was'' in an intoxicated condition. 
(R. 26) 
Dewey Becks~rom, City Marshall, ·testified that the 
M . . 
defendant ''"\\robbied'' as he walked. ''He couldn't walk 
like a normal pe-rson, s·oher person, no." (R. 32) The 
witness, Beckstrom, stated further that he went out of 
Panguitch with Mr. Luke to bring the jeep, which de-
fendant had driv~n, hack into Panguitch. In describing 
wh·ere the jeep was, the record states: 
"A. Out the road here. I "rould say maybe 
half a mile from the last house on the highway, 
right along in there. 
'' Q. This side of that Roller l\fill Hill o? 
' 'A. This side of that hill a ways.'' 
(R. 35-36) 
I 
Hugh Bailey, appellant, was convicted, by jury, of 
driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. 
·counsel stipulated that a hearing of eviden·ce of an in-
formation supplement could be heard before the court 
without a jury. The district attorney authenticated for 
the court the ·docket of the justice ·of the peace, Orian 
Salis.bury, deceased, through his successor justice of the 
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peace. Counsel for defendant stipulated 'that the docket 
in question ''ras the docket of Orian Salisbury, Justice of 
the Peace, and that the records contained therein were in 
his handwriting. (R. 66-'67) The court received the 
justice's docket for "whatever it is and what it says." 
(R. 66) Whereupon, counsel for defendant stated ''that 
disposes of the previous conviction and it is up to the 
court to examine that docket. We take the stand that it 
is not signed by anyone-" (R. 67). Defendant's counsel 
then made a motion to arrest the judgment of the jury 
on the theory that there was no proof of venue in the 
action. The ease was continued to be heard in Richfield, 
where further argument from defendant's counsel \Vas 
heard by the court. 
Subsequently, J. L. Sevy, .Jr., District Judge of the 
Sixth Judicial District Court, handed down a judgment 
on the information supplement which stated, inter alia: 
"~k, * * and the Court having heard the argu-
nH•nts by the State and the defense counsel, and 
the Court having denied the Motion to Arrest 
.J udg1nent on the verrliet, and the Court having 
\eard the eviden(·e -pertaining -to the offense 
charged in the Inforrnation Supplement reg~ard­
ing the previous conviction of Defendant of rlriv-
ing while under the influence of alcohol, and the 
Court finding that the allegattons of the Informa-
tion Supplement are sustained beyond a reason-
able doubt, and that Defendant 'vas guilty as 
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charged in the Information Supplement, and the 
Defendant having waived tin1e for pronouncement 
of judgment and having stated that he had no 
cause to show why judgment should not be pro-
nounced, 
"NOW, T'HEREFORE, IT IS THE· JUDG-
MENT OF THIS- COURT that the Defendant, 
HUGH BAILEY, is guilty of havingibeen convicted 
of the p.revio-us offense· as alleged in the Informa-
tion Supple1nen t herein." 
(R. 81) 
STATEMENT ·OF _P·OINTS 
POINT I. 
THE STATE PROVED VENUE AND THE VERDICT OF 
.THE JURY IS NOT CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND 
THEREBY THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ARREST OF JUDGMENT. 
POINT II. 
PROOF O:F A PRIOR CONVICTION WAS INTRO·DUCED 
AND THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT ON THE INFORMATION 
SUPPLEMENT. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE STATE PROVED VENUE AND THE VERDICT OF 
THE JURY IS NOT CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND 
THEREBY THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ARREST OF JUDGMENT. 
Appellant argues that venue was not sufficiently 
esta:hlishe1d in this case upon the p-roposition stated as 
follows: 
"Place. In the absence of a contrary statute, an 
averment of venue must be proved, and 
even an unnecessary allegation of place 
descriptive of the offense must he prov-
ed." 
42 C.J.S. 1263, Sec. 245. 
However, such is not the law in the State of Utah. Sec-
tion 77-8-4, U.C.A. 19"53, states: 
"* * * When a public offense is committed 
near the boundary of two or more counties the 
jurisdiction is in any of such counties." 
The application of this statute precludes any such ques-
tion from arising. Ho\vever, the Supre111e Court of the 
State of l 1 tah has very carefully outlined \vhat constitutes 
proof in estahlishing venue. In tltP ease of ~-9talf r. 
ill arasco, 81 li tah 325, 17 P. 2d 919, the defendant wa~ 
accused of the cri1ae of arson and ('onvicted in the dis-
trict court. On appeal, the appellant sought to overturn 
the judgment on the theory that sinee th(• location of the 
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burned house was simply described as "located in the 
outskirts of Helper, not in the main business part of 
town," and that the defendant's place of business was 
"th~ 'west end of Helper, Bryner Subdivision," venue 
was riot established as required. This Court, by C. ,J. 
Straup, Justice, stated, however : 
"* * * Flrom such testimony it 1nay reason-
ably be inferred that' the building and the goods 
destroyed by fire were located in H·elper. We 
judicially know that Helper is an incorporated city 
of the third class. * * * Helper being an incorpo-
rated ·city or town, the trial court and jury could 
judicially know that it was in Carbon county. * * * 
What in such particular the trial court in the cause 
could judicially know or "\vas required to know, 
we know. It would have been better had the trial 
court charged the jury that they could judicially 
know that Helper is in Carbon county, but no com-
plaint is made of that. The assignment a.s to venue 
is dis:allowed." 
As has been shown by appellant's brief, the jury, 
before finding the defendant guilty as charged, 'vere in-
structed by the court that it was atbsolutely essential to 
find, beyond a reasonable rloubt, from the evidence in the 
case that the crime of driving while intoxicated occurred 
in Garfield County, State of Utah, on Highway 89, about 
one mile East of Panguitch. Assuredly, under the de-
cisions heretofore rendered by this Court, such an in-
struction to the jury was excessive. 
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State v. Green., 38 Utah 389, 115 P. 181, was a case 
involving the crime of adultery. On appeal, the appellant 
plead that because the act was not positively proven to 
have taken place in the county in which the pros·ecution 
charged in the··complaint, venue was not established. This 
Court, holding that venue was sufficiently established, 
said: inter alia: 
"It is further con tended that proof of the 
venue is wanting. It is said that, even though the 
evidence be deemed sufficient to show that the 
defendant had carnal knowledge of the body of 
Madge Morey, there is not sufficient evidence to 
sliow that such act was committed in the county of 
Sanpete. The venue may be inferred from cir-
cuinstantial evidence as well a.s proved by direct 
evidence. * * * It is not made to appear that such 
act could have been co1nmitted at any other place 
except at Mt. Pleasant, in Sanpete county, Utah." 
Again, defendant's counsel at no time made any claim 
nor introduced any evidence which n1ight have lead either 
the court or the jury to the conclusion that the crime 
was actually or even conceivahly co1nmitted in any county 
other than Garfield (~ounty. 
The moRt recent deciRion hy the Ruprem.e Court of 
the Btate of lTtah, covering the subject of venue in crimi-
nal cases, is the case of Slate 1'. Mitchell, ------ Utah ------, 
________ P. 2d --------· The C·ourt stated: 
"* * * Son1e authorities, including this court, 
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permit venue to be established inferen·tially by 
circumstantial evidence. We believe and hold that, 
however it is proved, it must be done by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence only and not beyond a 
reasonable doubt, since venue is not an element 
of the offense, and there seems to be no reason 
to require the same quantum and quality of proof 
to prove venue as is required to prove such ele-
ments." 
Appellant in this case was found to be driving to-
ward Panguitch on Highway 89, and at the time the high-
way p'atrolman, Mr. Luke, stopped the jeep, whi~h the 
defendant was driving, the defendant was just East of 
Panguitch near what is called Roller Mill Hill. The court 
and the jury, on the authority of State v. Marasco, supra, 
had the right to take judicial notice of the fact that any 
reasonable distance to the East of Panguitch, Utah, had 
to he within the County of Garfield. The jury was charg-
ed with the specific responsibility of deciding that the 
evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that such 
"\Vas the case and under this specific instruction, the jury 
so held. Furthern1ore, jurors Blust be residents of the 
county in which the action is tried (78-46-8 (3), U.C.A. 
1953), which is strong support on behalf of the knowledge 
of the jurors as to vvhether a particularly described area 
was or was not in thP county in which they resided. 
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POINT II. 
PROOF O:F A PRIOR CONVICTION WAS INTRO·DUCED 
AND THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT ON THE INFORMATION 
SUPPLEMENT. 
Appellant argues that no proof of a prior conviction 
was introduced and that the evidence is insufficient to 
support the judgment of the court on the information 
supplement. The record shows that evidence was intro-
duced by the State in the form of the docket of the justice 
of the peace, Orian Salisbury, deceased. (R. 66-67) Mr. 
Delong, as successor justice of the peace, testified that he 
had received the docket referred to from the county at-
torney upon his appointment as justice of the peace and 
that no deletions or insertions had heen made to the rec-
ord. (R. 65-66) Defendant's counsel stipulated that the 
entry citing the conviction of the defendant, on p·age 234 
of said docket, was written in the handwriting of the for-
mer justice of the peace, Orian Salishury, and was in fact 
his docket. 
Section 78-5-16, U.C.A. 1953, stah}~: 
"The several particulars in the next preceding 
section specified must be entered under the title 
of the action to which they relate, and, unless 
otherwise in this Code provided, at the time when 
they occur. Such entries in a justices' docket, or a 
transcript thereof, certified by the justice or his 
successor in office, are prima facie evidence of the 
facts so stated." 
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To certify, according to Black's Ln \V Dictionary, 
3rd Edition, at p·age 301, is : 
''To testify in writing; to 1nake known or es-
tablish as a fact. * * * To vouch for a thing in 
writing. * * * To give a certificate, or to make a 
declaration about a writing. * * *" 
According to the section of the Utah Code, quoted 
above, the docket of a justice of the peace is "prin1a facie 
evidence of the facts so stated" and without being re-
butted would he proper evidence to he considered hy the 
court in this case with regard to the information sup-
plement. There is no evidence in the record to rehut the 
docket which "ras authenticated by the successor justice 
of the p·eace, Harry Delong, through interrogation of 
the State. The court specifically states, in rendering 
a judgment against the defendant, that the evidence 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had 
been. previously convicted as charged. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMI\1:IT ERROR IN 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
The evidence supports the verdict on thP question 
of venue. The court denied defendant a new trial because 
the evidence proved the State's case beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
App·ellant's argu1nent centers around the point that 
the facts did not prove venue, nor the prior ronviction 
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of appellant. However, the jury was instructed that be-
fore they could find,defendant guilty, they must find that 
driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor "oc-
curred in Garfield County, lJtah, on Highway ~9, about 
one mile East of Panguitch, Utah, in said county.'' (R. 72) 
After said instruction, the jury found the defendant 
guilty. Identification. of the area in .which the crime was 
committed is made in the record on the following pages·: 
Mr. Luke, Highway Patrolman, R. 4, ~' 14. 
Dewey Beckstrom, Panguitch City Marshall, R. 35, 
36. 
Defense Witness, Garn Wilcox, R. 43. 
Defendant, Hugh Bailey, R. 51. 
It is important to note that defendant and def.ense 
witness both identified the same place all other witnesses 
did. As a result, the jury was not puzzled as to where 
the crime was committed. 
Proof that the crime identified 1n the information 
supplen1ent was correct is horne out hy the authentication 
of the record of the justice of the peace, and, under Sec-
tion 78-5-16, became prirna facie evidence thereby. This 
evidence was never rebutted by defendant. Defendant's 
counsel on his n1otion to arrest judg~nent states: 
"* * * I can show Your Honor many cases, 
larceny cases and all where the venue isn't proved, 
and the State hasn't proved that it is in Garfield 
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County and I want to argue that motion before 
the court disposes of the case and then the judge 
can take judicial notice of whatever is on the con-
viction, * • *. " 
(R. 68) 
The defendant's counsel did not introduce any evidence 
to contradict the entry in the docket of the justice of the 
peace, but even gave 'the ''judge'' the right to take· judicial 
notice of a record already declared by statute to be prima 
facie evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the court below should be affirmed. 
Res·pectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLIS·TER 
Attorney General 
DONN E. CASSITY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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